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A casualty collection point (CCP) is a single, predetermined location that is organized, staffed, and equipped
to provide decontamination (if required), emergency medical assessment, treatment, and, where necessary,
onward transportation of victims of a mass casualty incident. Emergency planners in the District of Columbia
have recognized the desirability of developing a tool to assist planners in selecting CCPs within the affected
area following a major incident. We develop a CCP optimization model (CCPOM) that provides planners and
policymakers with strategic and operational insights into the complex problem of selecting optimal CCP locations
to maximize casualty throughput for a range of incident parameters. Even more relevant, the CCPOM determines
the utilization of personnel, decontamination units, and ambulances, providing planners with a general structure
for resource allocation and signaling shortfalls that may lead to bottlenecks in casualty processing at the CCPs.
District planners found many nonintuitive CCPOM results to be significant to their planning, programming, and
budgeting efforts, and now consider the model’s categorized resource utilization to be an integral part in updating
District plans for both national special security event planning and everyday events.
Keywords : casualty collection point; mixed-integer optimization; disaster relief.
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The District of Columbia (the District or DC) presentsa unique operating environment for emergency
planners. It is at once a city, state, and federal entity.
By law, it is also the nation’s capital and the seat of
federal government. In addition, it is an economic,
cultural, and transportation center of gravity in its own
right. During the day, the District accommodates more
than a million workers. In steady state, it is home to
more than half a million permanent residents. It boasts
many national monuments and icons, and its tourist
population, which numbers tens of thousands day
to day and 15 million annually, can swell to several
hundred thousand during large-scale national and
international events.
In practice, although the U.S. Congress retains
the right to review and overturn city council actions, the
mayor and city council exercise responsibility for the
day-to-day management of city functions. Necessarily,
this includes planning, preparing for, and responding
to disasters that might pose a threat to the District. The
agency charged with this mission is the DC Homeland
Security and Emergency Management Agency. The
primary planning document to implement this mission
is the December 2008 district response plan, a sensitive
but unclassified (SBU) source document not ordinarily
available to the public.
Pursuant to this plan, the DC Department of Health
(DOH) is tasked with establishing casualty collection
points (CCPs) in coordination with the District’s fire
and emergency medical services department. Publicly
available District planning documents, including the
plan, do not clearly define the functions of a CCP,
describe its organization, or set forth criteria for its
location. In reviewing a draft report on survivor receiv-
ing centers and staging areas provided by the District,
as well as the other planning documents provided by
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the contracting officer technical representative, we have
arrived at the following working definition:
A casualty collection point is a single, predetermined location
that is organized, staffed, and equipped to provide decon-
tamination 4as required5, emergency medical assessment,
treatment, and, where necessary, onward transportation of
victims of a mass casualty incident.
In the past, District planners selected CCPs using ad
hoc unwritten criteria and nontechnical methodologies.
However, the District has recognized the desirability of
developing a strategic and operational tool to assist
planners in selecting CCPs following a major incident.
In this paper, we discuss our development of such
a tool, which is a formal mathematical optimization
model that seeks to maximize the throughput of vic-
tims needing initial healthcare assessments and, where
necessary, treatment in the period immediately follow-
ing a major incident. District planners validated the
CCP optimization model (CCPOM) against a scenario
developed by emergency planners based on a District
threat assessment.
The result of this study is an operational tool that
provides District planners and policymakers with
strategic insights across a limitless range of incident
parameters. Although we performed the current study
for a single incident site (IS), we extended the model
to investigate a broader utility, which lies in its ability
to handle a larger number of hypothetical sites. The
model also provides the planners with a framework
for resource allocation and budgeting.
Related Literature
The use of optimization models to inform disaster
planning and response is relatively recent, but not novel.
Most of those studies focus on optimal facility locations.
In our view, analysis of models such as p-median and
set covering for location problems is quite mature in the
literature. Brandeau and Chiu (1989) present a survey
of a broad range of major location problems. Marianov
and ReVelle (1995) review locating emergency services
that involve spatial allocation. Owen and Daskin (1998)
address the strategic facility location problems focusing
on stochastic and dynamic characteristics that are
integral components of emergency planning. Daskin
and Dean (2004) classify location problems for health-
services facilities in accessibility, adaptability, and
availability models, and suggest applying concepts
such as scenario planning to health facilities. The review
by Caunhye et al. (2012) and the references therein
provide further studies.
In a disaster relief environment and broadly in the
public sector, the literature focuses on social welfare
through equity-based objectives by minimizing the
variability of the distribution of distances (Eiselt and
Laporte 1995, Erkut 1993). Dekle et al. (2005) model an
analogous location problem for Florida county disaster
recovery centers as a set-covering problem, and use a
two-stage approach to minimize the total number of
centers. The maximal-covering location model in Balcik
and Beamon (2008) incorporates inventory decisions in
response to a sudden-onset disaster by determining the
number and location of distribution centers and the
quantity of inventory at each center. Lee et al. (2009)
use a capacitated facility location model to determine
points of dispensing for the Atlanta metropolitan area.
The model considers population densities, maximum
travel distance, available private and public facilities,
and staff.
Drezner (2004) introduces CCPs, the primary moti-
vation for our study. Drezner et al. (2005) carry this
notion further by formally formulating a multiobjec-
tive location problem, which they illustrate with a
hypothetical large earthquake striking Orange County,
California. The authors propose a minimax regret multi-
objective model. The individual objectives are based on
the following concepts: p-median (average distance,
e.g., Hakimi 1964, Daskin 1995); p-centre (maximum
distance, e.g., Hakimi 1965, Daskin 1995); p-MaxCover
(population covered within several radii, e.g., Church
and ReVelle 1974); and minimum variance (distance
equity, e.g., Maimon 1986).
Most of the earlier research develops location models
with some type of equity measure as a primary goal;
for example, they minimize the maximum distance
between any individual and the facilities for distribu-
tion of emergency supplies, such as in the problem
of dispensing vaccines that Lee et al. (2009) discuss.
The existing research differs from our study in both
scope and objectives: We seek to locate and resource
triage facilities to optimize casualty throughput. In so
doing, we also minimize the aggregate time necessary
for onward transportation from CCPs to shelters. Our
focus is on both locating the facilities and optimizing
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the allocation of resources required to establish those
facilities. In this process, we identify the resources for
which a potentially critical shortfall exists.
Scenario Overview
District representatives provided simulated conditions
and supporting data to guide CCPOM development
and desired outputs. Our study focuses on CCP place-
ment recommendations based on a single test scenario:
the detonation of a one-kiloton (1-kT) improvised
nuclear device (IND) with Union Station as its epi-
center (i.e., as the IS for the scenario). Although the
given 1-kT IND scenario is not one of the 15 national
planning scenarios (Federal Emergency Management
Agency 2009), it is sufficiently similar to Scenario 1
(i.e., nuclear detonation—improvised nuclear device) of
these 15 scenarios to warrant using the model for IND
preparedness efforts.
The data provided can be classified into the detona-
tion and its effect. The detonation data include: the
nature of the detonation (ground burst); the relevant
period of interest (48 hours following the incident);
day of the week and time of the incident (weekday,
daytime); and weather conditions. With assumed west-
southwest prevailing winds, the fallout plume dis-
tributes east-northeast, away from the high-density
areas west and south of the IS. We note, however,
that a shift in actual winds could dramatically alter
the number and distribution of victims and the avail-
ability of candidate CCPs, and hence the ultimate
model results. The data on the effect of the detonation
include: the number of casualties and the healthcare
requirements of the victims (e.g., victims requiring
triage and follow-on care versus the walking well);
the speed distribution of casualties and the time when
those casualties would start seeking medical treatment;
and minimum and maximum radii (0.5 and 2.0 miles,
respectively) for CCP location, expressed as a distance
from the IS.
An IND incident of the type studied here could be
expected to result in a nontrivial number of fatalities
and critically wounded victims requiring immediate
care. CCPs would not ordinarily process either category
of victim because they will not perform mortuary func-
tions and the critically wounded will be transported
directly from the IS to hospitals. The remaining victims,
generally termed casualties, are the sole subjects we
consider in this study.
Structural damage resulting from a 1-kT nuclear
detonation would be relatively minor. In terms of
casualties, first responders and CCP staff can expect
that the most significant healthcare issues will arise
from victim radiation exposure after the initial blast. For
our test scenario, we assume that 13,000 casualties will
require medical care at CCPs, as predicted by a Defense
Threat Reduction Agency analysis. We further divide
these casualties into two distinct types (or waves) of
victims arriving at the CCPs. The first type (i.e., first
wave) includes those affected by the immediate blast.
The second type (i.e., second wave) includes those who
are affected by radiation from the nuclear weapon, but
who do not realize they need treatment until after they
experience symptoms.
In addition to scenario-specific data, the District has
also provided data and criteria that are common to
multiple disasters. Those include: descriptions and
locations of available hospitals and shelters; healthcare
worker data for CCPs (e.g., the average time required
to triage a patient and the personnel required); avail-
ability of ambulances (including ambulance buses) and
other forms of transport; average walking speeds for
ambulatory victims; and a generalized list of evaluation
criteria for determining the suitability of a particular




The CCPOM is a mathematical optimization model
that primarily seeks to maximize casualty throughput
at CCPs for a given set of conditions after an incident.
The CCPOM recommends the optimal location of
CCPs, CCP sizing, staff (and other resource) levels,
and transportation means allocation to maximize over-
all casualty throughput in the system. It determines
which fraction of casualties from both waves should be
directed to each selected CCP, and the casualty flow
from CCPs to shelters and hospitals. Within the CCPs,
the model accounts for casualty queues as patients
waiting to be decontaminated, triaged, or otherwise
treated.
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CCPs are triage sites. They are neither intended nor
equipped to provide long-term or specialized care to
victims. Accordingly, the CCPOM assumes that criti-
cally ill or wounded casualties will be transported to
hospitals after their initial evaluation and stabilization
at a CCP. District data estimate these as approximately
10 percent of the casualties. CCPOM ambulance alloca-
tion to CCPs ensures adequate capacity to transport
such casualties to hospitals.
Those casualties not requiring follow-on care, but
who cannot return home (e.g., because of structural
damage to their homes or radiation hazards), are
assumed to walk or use public transportation to prede-
termined shelter locations. In addition to maximizing
casualty throughput, as a secondary goal, the CCPOM
also minimizes travel time from CCPs to shelters. Vic-
tims who reside outside the District but need temporary
shelter (i.e., evacuees) are accommodated until they can
arrange transportation to their homes. The remaining
casualties require long-term shelter and subsistence.
These displaced persons (e.g., those who live within
the blast radius or, more likely, whose homes are in the
projected plume path) will not be allowed to return
home until conditions permit. Thus, casualties arrive
at CCPs in a first or second wave, and leave CCPs as
discharged, hospitalized, or sheltered as either evacuees
or displaced persons.
Formulation
We worked closely with District representatives to
refine and validate the data and specification of con-
straints that the optimization mode must enforce. We
agreed that the solution produced by the CCPOM must
ensure: (1) conservation of flow from both casualty
waves at CCPs, shelters, and hospitals; (2) casualty
flow management within CCPs based on the CCP’s
capacity for the various treatments; (3) staff and other
resources allocated to CCPs cannot exceed prespecified
levels; (4) shelter capacities for short- and long-term
casualties cannot be exceeded; (5) allocated ambulance
seat capacity must be adequate for transportation of
some casualties to hospitals, accounting for travel times;
and (6) hospital bed capacity cannot be exceeded. The
appendix shows the mathematical formulation of the
problem.
We implemented the CCPOM formulation in the
General Algebraic Modeling System (GAMS Devel-
opment Corporation 2013). The CCPOM applied in
the baseline test scenario, which we describe next,
has approximately 250,000 variables (104 binary) and
120,000 constraints, and runs in less than five minutes




Planning Horizon and Other General Data
As established by the District, the planning horizon for
the study begins at the time of the incident, referred to
herein as T0. The District’s goal is to process all casual-
ties as early as possible. District planners suggest 48
hours as an upper bound on the length of the planning
horizon to accomplish this goal. Time is subdivided
into intervals of 15 minutes (0.25 hours). This results
in 192 distinct periods, where t = 1 corresponds with
the first time interval after the incident (i.e., from T0
to T0 + 0025 hours). Similarly, the last time interval
(t = 192) corresponds to the last 15 minutes of our
planning horizon (i.e., from T0 + 47075 to T0 + 48).
The study posits a total affected population of 13,000
casualties. Of these, we assume 3,000 to be victims of
the blast. These victims, the so-called walking wounded,
will arrive in the first wave. The remaining 10,000
casualties, those suffering radiation effects, will arrive
hours or days later in the second wave. The flow of
victims through the system is modeled from the IS
to CCPs, and then from CCPs onward to shelters or
hospitals, or released outright. We derived the specific
proportions and directions after consultations with
District planners. However, to simplify the analysis,
the model does not take into account increased fatality
probabilities resulting from plume effects.
We expect that 40 percent of the casualties will be
released to return home after being processed through
a CCP. Of the remainder, 10 percent are expected to
require medical evacuation to a local hospital, and
50 percent will need at least temporary respite at
a designated area shelter. We further subdivide the
number needing transport to shelters into 75 percent
evacuees and 25 percent displaced.
Selection of Candidate CCPs
The District chose the blast site, IS, as ground zero
for the IND detonation, and further specified that
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candidate CCPs must be no less than approximately
0.5 statute miles and no more than approximately
2.0 statute miles from the epicenter of the detonation.
The rationale for the smaller of these parameters is that
operating a CCP too close to the blast site would be too
dangerous for responders for two reasons: residual blast
effects and expectation of intolerably high radiation
levels at that distance. The larger parameter reflects
the planners’ determination that expecting wounded
victims to walk too far to reach a CCP is unreasonable.
Candidate CCPs are determined by using 100-grid
squares of approximately 700 yards on a side. The grid
is superimposed on an overhead satellite view of the
subject area obtained from Google Earth (Google 2012).
For all grid squares that are not prima facie infeasible,
we use seven distinct criteria based on interviews with
District emergency planners:
(1) Proximity: Reflects the distance of the candidate
CCP from the IS, shelters, and hospitals.
(2) Access: Accounts for the location, size, and design
of nearby roads, alleyways, driveways, and parking
lots; the presence or absence of man-made barriers,
such as fences, walls, lane dividers, and curbs; the
presence or absence of natural barriers, such as hedges,
trees, and berms; and the ability of the candidate site to
accommodate large-scale decontamination equipment.
(3) Utilities: A fully functional CCP, particularly one
with a decontamination capability, requires electrical
power and water. Preferably, these would come from
buildings or other structures located at or very near
the chosen CCP site, which should have access to a
fresh water source, either through a plumbing system
or via fire hydrants.
(4) Space: Responders need adequate space to set up
the various stations a fully operational CCP requires.
A certain amount of physical space is also necessary
for decontamination operations, site security, vehicle
ingress and egress, and victim queuing.
(5) Fire stations: As the principal provider of emer-
gency medical services (EMS) within the District, its
fire department will have a significant share of the
burden of choosing, setting up, and supporting the
CCPs. Fire department equipment and personnel will
be needed for mass decontamination, victim evacuation
to hospitals, and other logistical support. CCPs will
need to be rapidly established and supplied almost
continuously. Locating the CCPs close to fire stations
will facilitate this process. Of note, in its current form,
the CCPOM does not factor in the distance from a
candidate CCP to the nearest fire station in selecting
CCPs, although we could easily add this to our model.
(6) Facilities: Physical facilities at a CCP site, or the
absence of such facilities, can significantly affect its
ability to accept large numbers of incident victims and
CCP personnel. Certain broad generalizations can be
made. For example, candidate sites with buildings
are generally preferable to undeveloped sites during
winter and inclement weather (e.g., a hurricane). The
same may be said of sites with preexisting emergency
equipment, such as electric generators or air and water
filtration systems.
(7) Other considerations: Tactical, operational, and
strategic factors that cannot be readily modeled may
render a site unsuitable. For example, clustering two
or more CCP locations in close proximity to each other
may increase the danger of a secondary attack, or
conflict with preplanned uses at specific CCPs may
result in a situation that warrants restricting activity at a
candidate site—or eliminating it as a viable alternative.
We used these criteria to assess each grid square
for possible candidate CCPs. Where more than one
suitable candidate CCP exists in a single grid square,
we chose only one.
In addition to basic geospatial data from Google
Earth, we used overlay files provided by the geographic
information system-information technology branch
of the District office of planning. These files depict
location information for hospitals, schools, fire stations,
community centers, and similar data. The previous
process yielded 52 candidate CCP locations.
For purposes of calculating the CCP distance from
ground zero, we used rectangular distance (instead
of straight-line distance) as realistic in urban areas
where people travel along established street patterns.
The candidate CCPs ranged from 0.44 to 2.75 miles in
rectangular distance from ground zero.
Shelters
The District Department of Transportation emergency
transportation annex to the district response plan, also
a SBU document, provides for the evacuation of victims
of a mass casualty incident to a number of shelters
dispersed throughout the District. The plan anticipates
that these shelters will be used primarily as (1) way
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stations for evacuee victims awaiting transportation to
destinations outside the District; and (2) longer-term
shelters for displaced victims unable to return to their
primary residences for extended periods.
In constructing the model, we assume that victims
travel from any CCP to any given shelter on foot or
by public transportation. The CCPOM determines the
shelter to which it should send a victim based on the
rectangular distance between the originating CCP and
the shelter, the shelter’s physical capacity, and the
casualties being sent from other CCPs.
The emergency transportation annex of the District
response plan identifies 21 specific shelter locations.
After consultations with District planners, we added
eight shelters for a total of 29 shelter locations.
In follow-up discussions, District planners proposed
the potential inclusion of two other shelters of very
large capacity, the National Guard Armory and the
Convention Center. When we added these sites to the
list of shelters, the CCPOM results were drastically
skewed because it allocated all casualties to one of
these shelters. We felt that these results were imprac-
tical. District planners also brought to our attention
that the availability of either site to serve as a mass
shelter is uncertain. Existing National Guard plans
called for the Armory to be used primarily, if not
exclusively, to support National Guard operations in
the National Capital Region. However, the Armory’s
potential unavailability as a long-term shelter may
render it suitable as a CCP, especially if Guard medical
units are called in to assist civilian providers, or if the
open space near the Armory is used for CCP operations.
Therefore, we retained the Armory on the list of poten-
tial CCPs, but eliminated it as a shelter. In addition,
the Convention Center is in a central location, close
to many potential targets. During our conversations
with District representatives, we discussed the issue of
predisposing the model to choose one or both of these
two sites over other suitable shelters. This appeared
to risk trivializing operational considerations, such as
multiple simultaneous or secondary attacks, including
attacks on the shelters themselves, fallout patterns,
competing uses, and the inherent logistical difficulties
of sheltering many more victims in a single location.
Accordingly, we excluded both locations from the list
of shelters.
Hospitals
We reviewed hospital capability data for healthcare
facilities in DC, Maryland, and Virginia. Because mutual
aid arrangements with Maryland hospitals are in their
early planning stages, we excluded Maryland facilities
from consideration.
We derived the baseline information requirements
from District of Columbia Hospital Association (2006),
an internal study. The study evaluates the state of hos-
pital readiness within the National Capital Region on a
number of criteria that assess both infrastructure and
capabilities. The study gathers information on hospital
bed space, including surge capacity. Of the 27 hospitals
included, 18 are surveyed. For the remaining nine
hospitals, DC health emergency preparedness response
administration (HEPRA) planners provided data. Five
hospitals do not report surge capacity. Therefore, the
CCPOM considers 22 hospitals that would meet the
minimum acceptable standard of care for providing
clinical services to arriving casualties.
Using information provided by the District, the
CCPOM assumes that ambulances would travel from
CCPs to hospitals and back at an average speed of five
miles per hour for hospitals within the District. This low
speed reflects expected delays for large-scale vehicular-
traffic congestion and pedestrian flows away from the
affected area. For hospitals in Virginia, it assumes an
average speed of 15 miles per hour, reflecting somewhat
lessened vehicular-traffic congestion and significantly
reduced pedestrian traffic outside the District. Based
on historical data, HEPRA planners determined that
approximately 178 spaces (seats and litters) would be
available, on average, for transporting victims between
CCPs and hospitals. The CCPOM also assumes that
each ambulance will be assigned to a unique CCP, but
could transport casualties to any hospital, as needed.
Casualty Arrival at CCPs
District planners assume that the vast majority of
victims would arrive at a CCP in one of two principal
waves. The first wave (blast casualties) is expected to
occur shortly after the primary IND explosion. The
second arrival wave (radiation casualties) is expected
to begin several hours after the incident and continue
for a period of days. Drawing from lessons learned
from past incidents and exercises, the expectation is
that certain numbers of asymptomatic casualties will
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report to CCPs merely because they are in the general
vicinity of the IS at the time of the incident and fear
they might have been affected.
District planners provided invaluable operational
perspective and feedback in developing the arrival
distributions. The model assumes that the first casualty
wave will not begin the journey from the IS to a CCP
until the CCPs are operating. Based on planner inputs,
the model expects that the first CCP will not be fully
operational until two hours after the incident has
occurred.
Once notified that CCPs are operational and ready
to accept casualties, at approximately T0 + 2 hours,
emergency personnel at the IS will begin grouping
casualties and directing them to specific CCPs. All casu-
alties will not travel at the same speed. The CCPOM
assumes an underlying, deterministic arrival pattern
that District planners suggested based on three cate-
gories of distances from the CCPs to the IS: near (less
than one mile), medium (between one and two miles),
and far (more than two miles). Within each category,
these deterministic patterns are such that their average
travel times are proportional to the distance. Also, the
arrival distribution patterns are more dispersed for
casualties who travel longer distances (see Figure 1).
For example, for a CCP located at 0.78 miles from
the IS, the assumed deterministic arrival distribution
has an average x̄ = 2094 hours. This figure reflects
two hours that casualties are assumed to remain at






















First wave arrival distribution
From IS to CCP at 0.78 miles
From IS to CCP at 1.52 miles
From IS to CCP at 2.20 miles
Figure 1: The diamonds, squares, and triangles show fractions of arrival
times for first-wave casualties for sample CCPs at various distances from
the incident site.
CCP. Standard deviation (ë) is 0.50 hours. For a CCP
located at 2.2 miles, these values are x̄= 4065 hours
and ë = 1057 hours, respectively.
A degree of uncertainty is inherent in estimating
the civilian population’s response to an IND incident
of the sort hypothesized. In the absence of empirical
data from past incidents, we relied on our discussions
with experienced emergency planners. From these
discussions, we derived that the onset of symptoms of
the affected population (i.e., citizens who did not realize
they were exposed) in the second wave occurs several
hours to days after radiation exposure. This is consistent
with the observed phases of acute radiation syndrome,
in particular the onset of prodromal symptoms (Federal
Emergency Management Agency 2010, p. 83). Other
than the decontamination units, the CCPs are presumed
not to have resources for explicit radiation treatment.
Necessarily, such victims are sent to hospitals. Because
reliably estimating the percentages in the first and
second waves is difficult, we followed the guidance of
District planners for casualty proportions in each wave.
Figure 2 shows the second-wave arrival pattern.
Because the second wave of casualties is comprised
almost exclusively of those suffering from delayed
symptoms of radiation exposure, these individuals do
not travel directly from the IS to the CCPs. As a practi-
cal matter, determining the point of origin for each
casualty in this second wave is effectively impossible.
To simplify the analysis, we assume that, regardless
of point of origin, District emergency responders will
direct these second-wave victims to an appropriate





















Second wave arrival distribution
Figure 2: The arrival pattern of fractions of second-wave casualty arrivals at
a CCP over time is close to normal distribution with the average arrival time
occurring at approximately T0 + 15 hours, as provided by District planners.
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Minimum
required Average time to Casualties requiring Unitary capacity Total capacity
Resource (units) Available (units/CCP) process (min/casualty) the service (%) (casualties/unit-hour) (casualties/hour)
Decontamination units (units) 25 1 0050 100 10000 21500
Triage EMS (persons) 72⇤ 12 3000 100 1607 1120204
Administrators (persons) 300 3 2000 100 2500 71500
EMS nurse supervisors (persons) 150 15 12000 100 402 630
Behavioral staff (persons) 60 3 5000 1 1100000 601000
Security, command, and control (persons) 112 12 2000 100 2500 21800
Transportation preparation (persons) 30 3 2000 1 2150000 751000
Ambulance spaces (seats) 178 1 Depends on trips 10 Depends on trips
Table 1: The data in the table are based on the input provided by the District planners.
⇤Includes resources projected to be supplied by National Medical Response Teams (NMRTs). The number of
available medical staff includes five 12-person teams sourced from District healthcare facilities and 12 personnel
from the NMRTs.
these casualties call into a dispatching system to ask
for guidance. Directly or indirectly, emergency respon-
ders can then retain significant control over the travel
patterns of both waves of casualties.
Service Allocation to CCPs
Once they arrive at a CCP, casualties must wait to be
processed, evaluated, treated, and released, or des-
ignated for follow-on transport, as appropriate. To
operate efficiently and minimize the total time for
patients to be treated, each CCP must be staffed ade-
quately. Therefore, the CCPOM must also optimize
the distribution of personnel, equipment, and other
resources across all selected CCPs.
To accurately model internal CCP operations, we
researched the notional makeup of a typical CCP
and consulted with HEPRA planners. We deemed the
following categories of resources to be required within
each CCP: decontamination units, triage medical staff
(primarily nurses and EMS personnel), administrators,
EMS nurse supervisors, behavioral specialists, security
personnel, command and control personnel, ambulance
spaces, and transportation preparation teams.
To enhance the model’s realism, we incorporated
certain operational considerations into the design. First,
the CCPOM broadly compensates for workload and
personnel fatigue by assuming that all CCP personnel
will work an average of 50 minutes per hour (i.e., 5/6
of the time). Given resource constraints, to assume that
replacement personnel will be available for each CCP
worker is unrealistic; therefore, the CCPOM does not
make this assumption.
Second, the model assumes that most services are
applied to 100 percent of the casualties; the exceptions
are behavioral staff, which it applies to one percent
of the casualties (usually because of mental health
crises after the incident), and transportation prepara-
tion, which it applies to one percent of the casualties
(a fraction of those casualties who go to hospitals also
need special assistance).
Table 1 summarizes the essential characteristics of
each resource. For example, the CCPOM assumes that
triage EMS is 72. The minimum established medical
staffing requirement at each CCP is 12 staff members.
It takes three minutes, on average, to triage a casualty.
Thus, hypothetically, each medical staff person allocated
to a CCP could treat 20 casualties per hour. Because
medical staff personnel are only available 5/6 of the
time, we correct the hourly throughput for this service,
which becomes approximately 16.7 casualties per triage
EMS per hour, and list this number as unitary capacity.




For practical reasons, the District specified that the
model should choose at least two and no more than five
CCPs. When applied to the baseline scenario described
in the previous section, the CCPOM selects five CCPs
from the candidate list.
CCPOM choices do not show a clear pattern (see
Figure 3) based on geography, size, or other obvious
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Figure 3: The house icons are the locations of optimal CCPs as generated by the CCPOM for the baseline scenario
using Google Earth (Google 2012); the fire icon represents the incident site.
factors. The model clearly weighs a number of variables
and complex relationships to arrive at a nontrivial
solution.
Table 2 breaks down the number of casualties ser-
viced by each CCP for each wave of arrivals. The
proportion of second-wave victims to first-wave victims
treated is roughly equivalent across CCPs. However,
this does not imply that each CCP will service a pro-
portionate share of casualties. Rather, as the results
show, each CCP will service a different percentage of
casualties based on factors such as distance from the
IS, staffing levels, and ambulance availability.
CCP First wave Second wave Total
Options Public Charter School (OPCS) 503 11687 21190
Folger Park (FP) 697 21295 21992
Hamilton Center (HC) 11204 41050 51254
Nat’l Mall 3rd/4th st. (NM-3/4) 298 983 11281
Nat’l Mall 4th/6th st. (NM-4/6) 298 985 11283
Total 31000 101000 131000
Table 2: For each wave of arrivals, the table lists CCPs selected in the
baseline scenario and the distribution of casualties each CCP services.
The CCPOM projects all casualties can be treated
and sent to their final destinations within the 48-hour
planning horizon. Interestingly, the model projects that
NM-3/4 and NM-4/6 will serve virtually identical
numbers of casualties from both waves. Intuitively
this makes sense, because both CCPs have identical
characteristics and are adjacent to each other. Running
independent operations with separate staffs, adminis-
trators, logistics, and command and control centers
might lead to inefficiencies, competition for scarce
resources, and congestion arising from unsynchronized
pedestrian and vehicular-traffic flows. Conversely, cre-
ating a mega-CCP with a single command element
may exceed the site commander’s span of control, thus
introducing bureaucratic confusion and inefficiencies.
Ultimately, District decision makers must weigh the
alternatives using input from analytical tools, such
as the CCPOM, and other relevant sources, such as
exercises, subject matter experts, and published best
practices.
In addition to selecting the optimum CCP locations,
the CCPOM allocates available staff and transportation
resources among the selected CCPs. Table 3 shows the
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CCP
Resource (units) OPCS FP HC NM-3/4 NM-4/6 Used resource (vs. available)
Decontamination units (units) 2 2 3 1 1 9 (25)
Triage EMS (persons) 12 12 15 12 12 63 (72)
Administrators (persons) 402 508 10 3 3 26 (300)
EMS nurse supervisors (persons) 2504 3406 60 15 15 150 (150)
Behavioral staff (persons) 3 3 3 3 3 15 (60)
Security, command and control (persons) 12 12 12 12 12 60 (112)
Transportation preparation (persons) 3 3 3 3 3 15 (30)
Ambulance spaces (seats) 2507 4608 7400 1407 1608 178 (178)
Maximum throughput (casualties/hour) 105 14403 250 6206 6206
Table 3: The table lists the resource utilization in the baseline scenario for the CCPs. The last column compares the
number of resources that are allocated to all CCPs with the amount of resources that were originally available for
each resource category.
utilization of resources among the five CCPs. Given
that HC has the greatest number of casualties processed
(from Table 2), it requires more resources than the
other CCPs: its maximum throughput of 250 casualties
served per hour is also the largest among the chosen
CCPs. That maximum throughput is capped by the
individual resources available; it is calculated as the
minimum of the product of each individual resource
throughput and its associated throughput rate from
Table 1.
We observe that EMS nurse supervisors are a critical
resource, because all available personnel are utilized.
The model allocates all available ambulance seats
among the five CCPs, thus making this resource also
critical. The combined effects of fully utilizing ambu-
lance seats are to expedite the transportation of patients
to hospitals with open bed space and minimize the
time casualties need to wait for ambulances after being
treated at a CCP. Note that less than 10 percent of
the available administrative personnel is utilized. The
number of available security and command and control
personnel is almost double the number needed. We
also observe that only nine of 25 decontamination units
are utilized.
The model projects that nearly all shelters will be
utilized to their maximum capacities for both displaced
casualties and evacuees. The utilization results are
based on one wave of arrivals at shelters. Operational
experience may warrant post-study modifications to the
model to account for additional waves, or to incorporate
arrival patterns of a stochastic nature.
The final flow modeled by the CCPOM is the move-
ment of more severely injured or ill victims from
CCPs to hospitals. This accounts for 10 percent of all
casualties treated at CCPs (1,300 victims).
Of the 22 hospitals included in the study, only INOVA
Fairfax Hospital is not utilized, possibly because it is
located farther from the IS. This reflects the attempt
to reduce total transportation time of all ambulance
trips, given the limitation of that resource (see Table 3).
Of the hospitals receiving casualties, six are utilized
to their full surge capacity. This occurs in spite of the
hypothesis that a relatively modest number of casualties
will need hospitalization. A larger-scale incident with
a higher number of casualties or hospitalization rate
could well tax regional medical assets beyond their
capabilities.
The primary objective (z1 in the appendix) mea-
sures promptness in casualty treatment by maximizing
weighted throughput of casualties, where weights are
inversely proportional to the time when casualties
are treated (patients treated over time). Because each
hour has four 15-minute periods, a casualty treated
in period t= 10 (2.5 hours after the detonation) con-
tributes 4/10 (= 0.4) weighted casualties per hour to the
objective function, whereas a casualty treated in period
t = 30 contributes 4/30 (⇡ 0013) weighted casualties per
hour. These figures are then aggregated for all 13,000
casualties to yield a single number representative of
overall casualties treated per hour. Overall, the objective
function value for the baseline scenario is z1 = 11390
weighted casualties per hour. Note this does not imply
an average of 13,000/1,390 (⇡ 9.35) hours per casualty
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Figure 4: Figure (a) depicts the flow of patients from the CCP from Folger
Park; (b) shows the cumulative flow for all CCPs in the baseline scenario.
The horizontal axes show time (hours) and the vertical axes show number of
casualties.
because of the weights used (inversely proportional
to time). We can calculate the actual average time to
process a casualty by using results on the number
of casualties served by period and CCP (S
ct
in the
appendix). The resulting average time, including both
waves, is 13.2 hours.
Figure 4(a) demonstrates the fluctuation of the queue
length relative to arrival patterns and processed casu-
alties at a selected CCP. The pattern evidenced in
the figure is representative of those at other CCPs.
The differential between total arrived versus served
casualties is represented by the gap between the two
graphs in Figure 4(b).
The second objective is the total time to shelters (z2
in the appendix). This is simply the sum of all trip
times incurred by 50 percent of the casualties as they
travel from CCPs to shelters. Casualties in the baseline
scenario require 8,242 hours.
CCP First wave Second wave Total
NM-3/4 11211 31982 51193
NM-4/6 11212 31974 51186
Lafayette Square (LS) 577 21044 21621
Total 31000 101000 131000
Table 4: For each wave of arrivals, the table lists the CCPs selected in the
mall scenario and the distribution of casualties that each CCP services.
Mall Scenario
In this scenario, the CCPOM is constrained to consider
only 11 candidate CCPs in the immediate vicinity of
the National Mall. The CCPOM chooses three CCPs as
optimal, including NM-3/4 and NM-4/6, which are
more extensively used than in the baseline scenario.
Table 4 summarizes the throughput results.
As in the baseline scenario, the CCPs chosen generate
sufficient capacity to process all 13,000 casualties. Under
this scenario, each NM CCP processes four times more
casualties with respect to the baseline scenario. The
CCPOM also treats the two adjacent CCPs as collocated,
dividing workload, staffing, and resources equally
between them (see Table 5).
Nurse supervisors are again a critical resource,
and the CCPOM recommends allocating all available
resources to the three CCPs. In contrast, ambulance
seats are no longer a limiting constraint; of the 178
seats available, only 123 are needed.
CCP
Used resource
Resource (units) NM-3/4 NM-4/6 LS (vs. available)
Decontamination units
(units)
3 3 2 8 (25)
Triage EMS (persons) 15 15 12 42 (72)
Administrators (persons) 10 10 5 25 (300)
EMS nurse supervisors
(persons)
60 60 30 150 (150)
Behavioral staff (persons) 3 3 3 9 (60)
Security, command and
control (persons)
12 12 12 36 (112)
Transportation preparation
(persons)
3 3 3 9 (30)




Table 5: For the CCPs, the table lists the resource utilization in the mall
scenario. The last column compares the amount of resources allocated to
all CCPs with the amount of resources originally available for each resource
category.
Apte, Heidtke, and Salmerón: Casualty Collection Points Optimization for DC
160 Interfaces 45(2), pp. 149–165, © 2015 INFORMS
The CCPOM predicts that only 11 shelters (of 29
available) will be needed to accommodate all displaced
casualties. By coincidence, the number of chosen shel-
ters is identical to the number chosen in the baseline
scenario. The CCPOM solution expresses a preference
for shelters with available capacity closer to the CCPs;
it fills all but two of those shelters to capacity.
The same basic premises apply for evacuees. Accom-
modating all 6,500 evacuees requires 15 shelters. By
comparison, the baseline scenario requires 16 shelters.
Regarding transportation to hospitals, the CCPOM
distributes the 1,300 casualties requiring hospitalization
among all 22 hospitals in the National Capital Region
that report surge capacity. Unlike the baseline scenario,
INOVA Fairfax Hospital is included, although at a
relatively low utilization level.
The overall primary objective for this scenario is
z1 = 1,381 weighted casualties per hour, insignificantly
less than in the baseline scenario (1,390 casualties
per hour). However, for the secondary objective, z2 =
101124 hours is significantly worse than in the baseline
scenario (8,242 hours, an increase of 22.8 percent). In
this scenario, for casualties traveling from CCPs to
shelters, the average transit time increases by almost
20 minutes per casualty.
One-Mile Scenario
The second rule modeled for comparison purposes
mandates selecting CCPs within one statute mile of the
IS. Only 11 of 52 total candidate CCPs qualify; from
these 11, the CCPOM chooses five CCPs as optimal,
all of which differ from the CCPs selected in the
two previous scenarios. As in the baseline and mall
scenarios, all 13,000 casualties are treated at the CCPs
(see Table 6).
CCP First wave Second wave Total
MCI Center (MCI) 391 11229 11620
Walker Jones Education Center (WJ) 532 11674 21206
Ludlow Taylor Elementary School (LT) 916 31404 41320
McKinley Technical High School (MT) 852 21708 31560
U.S. Capitol—South Lawn (CSL) 309 985 11294
Total 31000 101000 131000
Table 6: For each wave of arrivals, the table lists the CCPs selected in the
one-mile scenario and the distribution of casualties that each services.
The CCPOM projects all casualties can be treated and sent to their final
destinations within the 48-hour planning horizon.
CCP
Used resource
Resource (units) MCI WJ LT MT CSL (vs. available)
Decontamination units
(units)
1 2 3 2 1 9 (25)
Triage EMS (persons) 12 12 1204 12 12 6004 (72)
Administrators (persons) 301 403 803 609 3 2506 (300)
EMS nurse supervisors
(persons)
1807 2505 4905 4103 15 150 (150)
Behavioral staff (persons) 3 3 3 3 3 15 (60)
Security, command and
control (persons)
12 12 12 12 12 60 (112)
Transportation preparation
(persons)
3 3 3 3 3 15 (30)
Ambulance spaces (seats) 3703 26 6205 4007 1105 178 (178)
Maximum throughput
(casualties/hour)
7705 10603 20604 17202 6206
Table 7: For the CCPs, the table lists the resource utilization in the one-mile
scenario. The last column compares the amount of resources that are
allocated to all CCPs with the amount of resources that were originally
available for each resource category.
Results for resource utilization are analogous to the
results from the previous scenarios. Nurse supervisors
continue to be a critical resource. Ambulance seats are
fully utilized, as they were in the baseline scenario.
With the exception of those two categories, the model
does not fully allocate any resources (see Table 7).
Shelters and their expected number of casualties
differ from those in previous scenarios. However, in
each scenario, the CCPOM shows that ample system-
wide shelter capacity for both short- and long-term
needs is available.
The model details the movement of casualties requir-
ing hospitalization from the CCPs to area hospitals.
Trends noted in the first two scenarios continue for the
incumbent scenario. All 22 hospitals receive casualties.
However, the proportion of total casualties received at
each hospital changes from scenario to scenario; this
reflects the different distances from CCPs in the three
scenarios studied.
Specifically, in the one-mile scenario, we observe
shorter trips to shelters: the secondary objective
improves to z2 = 71775 hours (six percent better than
in the baseline scenario—on average, 4.3 minutes per
casualty). This occurs at the expense of worsening the
primary objective: z1 = 1,317 weighted casualties per
hour, a 5.5 percent decrease (see Table 8).
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z1 (maximize weighted z2 (minimize
Scenario casualties/hour) traveling hours)
Baseline 11390 81242
Mall 11381 101124
One mile 11317 71775
Table 8: The table shows an objective function comparison of the three
scenarios.
By interacting with the District planners, which led
to the development of the two additional scenarios, we
realized that the three scenarios offered three different
CCP configurations, yet similar throughput, as mea-
sured by z1. Our recommendation to add a secondary
objective in the form of travel time to shelters supple-
mented the planners’ understanding of their system.
Specifically, they realized the significance of previously
unidentified derivative effects, such as increased travel
time.
Use of Results by District Planners
District planners deem many nonintuitive CCPOM
results to be significant to their planning, programming,
and budgeting efforts. For planning purposes, the
model’s categorized resource utilization was one of the
most important contributions. For example, prior to
the study, anecdotal evidence suggested the need to
acquire large numbers of decontamination units, with
commensurate increases in trained decontamination
personnel. Contrary to this previously unverified need,
the model consistently predicted an excess capacity in
decontamination units. Consequently, the District was
able to considerably reduce the number of such units
in its planning assumptions, and decrease or eliminate
programmed purchases of decontamination equipment.
As a second-order effect, the substantial cost savings
achieved allowed the District to use these funds to
help it secure other resources that were originally
underestimated. For example, based on persistent
shortfalls revealed by the study, the need estimates
for nurse supervisors and ambulances were modified.
Thus, apart from selecting CCPs, the model has been
instrumental in providing the planners with a verifiable
decision support tool for resource allocation, with
key insights into the planning, programming, and
budgeting processes.
In addition to estimating resource requirements, the
model yielded other nonintuitive results. Conventional
wisdom might suggest that optimal throughput could
be achieved by activating CCPs in order, from the
closest to the incident site to the most distant. The
model results, however, showed that the optimal order
and timing of CCP activation was not necessarily lin-
ear. In this way, the model encouraged planners to
challenge untested assumptions, and evaluate previ-
ously unconsidered alternatives. For example, they had
not considered locating two CCPs side by side. Quite
unexpectedly, both the baseline and mall scenarios
recommended collocating two CCPs at the National
Mall. District plans were updated based on this result;
the planners now consider this alternative an integral
part of planning for both national special security event
planning and everyday events.
This study and its results have prompted further
inquiry by the District; specifically, these results have
become important inputs for a larger study, National
Capitol Region, Key Response Planning Factors for the After-
math of Nuclear Terrorism, which Lawrence Livermore
Labs is doing for the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security.
Extension to Multiple Incident Sites
To understand the limitations of the CCP model capa-
bilities to handle more complex scenarios, we solved a
number of instances, including different origins for
the casualties. These could be used to model multiple
incident sites, or only one IS, which affects a large area
that we wish to divide.
Specifically, based on our baseline scenario, we
investigated adding three new incident sites, populated
with first-wave casualties who are subtracted from
either the initial IS or from the second wave. In some
instances, the new problems require up to three hours
to be solved within one percent from optimal. This
computational time may still be considered acceptable
for planning purposes.
The results show that, on average, approximately
50 percent of the selected CCP locations change with
respect to those in the baseline case. The distribution of
the resources across CCPs is similar in all cases; most
importantly, the critical limiting resources creating the
bottlenecks (maximum throughput per hour at each
CCP) are the same as in the single-IS case: EMS nurse
supervisors and ambulance spaces.
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Conclusions
CCPOM is an analytical engine to support strate-
gic planning for future incidents. District planners
have validated it for a stated, static set of conditions.
We developed and refined the model through an iter-
ative, collaborative process that effectively merges
the academic realms of optimization modeling and
management science with the operational experience
and institutional knowledge of District planners and
emergency responders.
The model generates discrete combination of CCPs,
staffing levels, and ambulance allocations that sat-
isfy the primary objective of generating the highest
total-victim throughput system wide. Collaterally, the
CCPOM also optimizes the distribution of casualties
from both waves to the CCPs, and the movement of
casualties from the CCPs to shelters and hospitals.
Although we investigated different scenarios to
provide emergency planners with nonintuitive insights
into persistent resource overages and shortfalls, our
study is limited in scope to the conditions provided by
the District. Its conclusions are relevant for a given
range of conditions. However, District planners are
faced with the challenge of planning for a myriad of
scenarios, affecting parts of the region differently and
requiring different responses, all in an environment of
constrained resources and constricting budgets. The
CCPOM has sufficient flexibility to allow it to be used
for operational testing and further what-if analysis;
thus, District planners can expand the model’s utility
by identifying additional areas for investigation. For
example, future excursions of the model may include
extensive sensitivity analysis for resource allocation in
case of multiple incident sites (for which the model is
already established), and with alternative objectives
and uncertainties.
Appendix
This appendix describes the mathematical formulation for
the CCPOM.
Sets:
i 2 I , c 2C, h 2H , l 2 L incident site(s), candidate CCPs,
hospitals, and shelters, respectively.
r 2R Resources, R=RD [RC , where RD is the subset of
discrete resources (e.g., decontamination units) and
R
C is the subset of continuous resources (e.g., nurses).
t 2 T Periods 80111 0 0 09.
Parameters [units]:





Casualties in a first wave, originating from IS i
[casualties].
k




c Number of periods to set up CCP c before treat-








ict Fraction of those arriving at CCP c from IS i





Fraction of those arriving at all CCPs from
unspecified origins at the beginning of period t
[fraction].
(Note: Both pIict and p
W
t
are derived from a given
deterministic fraction of casualties arriving at






Average time for casualties to travel from CCP c
to shelter s (using public transportation or by









Queuing capacity at CCP c, and physical capacity
at shelter l and hospital h [persons].
q
B Total ambulance capacity available (including
ambulance bus) [seats].
f
LLT , f LST , f H Fraction of casualties who need to go to
shelters (long term), shelters (short term), and





, ur Initially available amount of resource r [resource-
unit hours per hour] and processing capacity
per unit of resource r [casualties/resource-unit
hour], respectively.
mr , m̄r Minimum and maximum of resource r at any
CCP, respectively [resource units].
n1 n̄ Minimum and maximum number of CCPs to
locate, respectively [# of CCPs].
ã Small penalty to ensure no unnecessary resources
are allocated; we set this penalty to 0.0001 in all
our instances.
Decision variables:











, F Hcht Flow of casualties from IS i to CCP c,
from unspecified origin to CCP c, from CCP c
to shelter l (for long-term stay), from CCP
c to shelter l (for short-term stay), and from
CCP c to hospital h in period t, respectively
[casualties].
Qct , Act , Sct Queue length at the end of, arrivals at the begin-
ning of, and casualties served (treated) during
period t, respectively, at CCP c [casualties].
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Xcr Number of resource r allocated to CCP c
[resource-unit hours per hour].
Bc Number of ambulance seats allocated to CCP c
[seats].
z1, z⇤1 Primary objective function, and its optimal
value, respectively [weighted casualties].




























8 c1 8 t > 00 (3)
Qc0 =Ac0 = Sc0 = 0 8 c0 (4)
Qct =Qc1 tÉ1 +Act É Sct 8 c1 8 t > 00 (5)
Qct  qCc Yc 8 c1 8 t > 00 (6)
Sct = 01 8 c1 80< t < tsetupc 0 (7)
Sct  durf Rrt Xcr 8 c1 8 t > 01 8 r 2R0 (8)
X
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Xcr  a0r 8 r 2R0 (9)
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Xcr   0 8 c 2C1 r 2RC 0 (21)
Xcr   0 and integer 8 c 2C1 r 2RD0 (22)
Yc 2 80119 8 c 2C0 (23)
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z1   0099z⇤10 (26)
CCPOM-1: z⇤1 =max z1, subject to (1)–(23).
CCPOM-2: z⇤2 =min z2, subject to (1)–(23), (26).
Description of the formulation:
Constraint (1) ensures all casualties from each IS are
distributed across the CCPs. Constraint (2) does the same,
but for second-wave casualties (from unspecified origins).
In both cases, we assume emergency staff members can
direct individual and (or) groups of casualties to whichever
CCPs they deem appropriate. Constraint (3) assumes that the
arrival of casualties at any given CCP follows a prespecified
distribution over time. Typically, the distribution is based
on the distance between the IS and the CCP: The farther
away they are from each other, the more dispersed the
arrival distribution will be. This distribution applies to the
total number of casualties the model decides should be
directed to travel from each IS to each CCP. The same concept
applies to second-wave casualties. Constraints (4)–(6) handle
queues at the CCPs: Constraint (4) establishes the initial
conditions at time 0. Constraint (5) ensures the queue length
increases with casualty arrivals and decreases with treated
casualties. Constraint (6) ensures queues (at established CCPs)
never exceed the CCP capacities. Constraint (7) ensures
that no treatment is provided before the CCP has been
set up (even if arrivals have occurred), and constraint (8)
limits that service based on the resources allocated to the
CCP. Note that this occurs for each resource individually
considered; thus, the most restrictive one applies in each
period. Constraints (9) and (10) distribute available resources
within the limits of each CCP. Constraints (11)–(14) ensure
the appropriate fractions of treated casualties are distributed
across long- and short-term shelters, without exceeding
their capacities. No specific constraint is associated with the
timing in this process because these patients may wait at
the CCP for public transportation (or walk to the shelter).
Traveled distance is still penalized in the second objective
function (see next). However, constraints (15)–(18) ensure
that sufficient ambulance seats are allocated to the CCP on a
period-to-period basis. This takes into account: (i) the fraction
of casualties that will be transported to hospitals; (ii) assumed
two-way trips by the ambulances; (iii) hospital capacity; and
(iv) total ambulance seats available. Constraint (19) limits the
number of CCPs selected. Constraints (20)–(23) establish the
domain for decision variables.
Objective function (24) maximizes weighted throughput
of casualties, where weights are inversely proportional to
the time when casualties are treated to give higher priority
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to casualties treated early. This constitutes our first model,
CCPOM-1. Constraint (25) is a secondary goal, optimized
after objective function (24), which minimizes travel time
to shelters for all casualties in the system, but subject to
constraint (26), which establishes the threshold on the primary
goal. This model, CCPOM-2, is executed after CCPOM-1.
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Verification Letter
John Donnelly, Battalion Chief, Homeland Security, Office of
Domestic Preparedness, District of Columbia Fire and EMS,
1338 Park Road NW, Washington, DC 20010, writes:
“Aruna, Curtis, and Javier,
“I have just finished reviewing the article, ‘Casualty Col-
lection Points Optimization: A Study for the District of
Columbia.’ This article brings back fond memories of working
on this project and the team we had assembled to address
this problem.
“The article accurately portrays the process and the broad
scale of participation required to identify and collect the data
used by the Casualty Collection Points Optimization Model.
The results of the planning and modeling effort were used
to update and inform and District Response Plan and the
District of Columbia Fire and Emergency Medical Services
Department’s Mass Decontamination Plan.
“I endorse your team’s article and support its publication.”
Aruna Apte received her PhD in operations research from
Southern Methodist University in Dallas and her master’s in
mathematics from Temple University in Philadelphia. She is
an associate professor in operations and logistics management
in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at
the Naval Postgraduate School. She teaches mathematical
modeling, for which she won the best teacher award. She has
advised more than 60 students for MBA/master’s reports. Her
research interests are in developing mathematical models for
complex, real-world operational problems using optimization
tools. Her research is focused on humanitarian and military
logistics. Before NPS, she worked as a consultant at MCI
and taught at the Cox School of Business, SMU, where she
won the best teacher award. She served as the president for
Humanitarian Operations and Crisis Management College in
Production and Operations Management Society.
Curtis Heidtke is an attorney-advisor at the U.S. Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. At the time
of the execution of this project he was a homeland security
consultant based in Washington, DC, providing federal, state,
and local governments and private entities with strategic
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solutions to homeland security-related problems. He was
formerly with the Office of General Counsel, Intelligence
and Analysis Division at the U.S. Department of Homeland
Security. Heidtke is a retired U.S. Air Force judge advocate. He
is a command pilot with over 2,500 hours in high-performance
military aircraft. He holds a Bachelor of Science from the
U.S. Air Force Academy, a Master of Science in systems
management from the University of Southern California,
a Juris Doctorate from the University of Michigan, and a
Master of Arts in Homeland Security and Defense from the
Naval Postgraduate School.
Javier Salmerón received his MS and PhD in mathemat-
ics from Complutense University of Madrid and Polytech-
nic University of Madrid, respectively. He is an associate
professor in the Operations Research Department at the
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), where he teaches courses
and performs research in optimization and its applications.
Before his time with NPS, Dr. Salmerón was with the engi-
neering branch of Spanish electric utility Iberdrola and
an adjunct professor in the Department of Statistics and
Operations Research at the Statistics School of Complutense
University.
